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Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough

Article Abstract:

A social choice function considering a situation of complete information assumes the existence of an equilibrium which does not progress beyond the first stage, which can also be referred to as 'one round of signaling.' It is argued that this assumption is not correct in the case of incomplete information. An example of a social choice function which cannot be realized with extensive form game if considered in an equilibrium with one round of signaling is presented. The social choice function can be achieved using an extensive mechanism only when a second stage equilibrium is realized.

Author: Brusco, Sandro
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
Social choice

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The partnered core of a game without side payments

Article Abstract:

The Scarf's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments is affirmed with the introduction of the partnered core of a game without side payments. It is shown that a balanced game guarantees that there is at least one partnered core payoff. It is also shown that there is at least one core payoff in the partnered core of a game that is minimally partnered if a game has at most a countable number of points. This means that no other player requires another player to obtain his part of the core payoff.

Author: Reny, Philip J., Wooders, Myrna Holtz
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Competition (Economics)

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Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information

Article Abstract:

An analysis of common belief and game theory set under perfect information conditions is presented. The analysis focuses on Bayesian rational functions defined by two-person games with perfect information. It is shown that situations where a theory defines Bayesian rationality for all and sets common belief conditions is not valid. These results generate an impact on standard solution concepts.

Author: Reny, Philip J.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1993
Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis

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Subjects list: Research, Economics, Information theory, Game theory, Information theory in economics
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