Implementing action profiles when agents collude

Article Abstract:

A study considered a situation where a principal instructs a group of agents to take a given action profile that is not seen by the principal but is witnessed by the agents' colleagues. Thus, collusion is possible among the agents. It was demonstrated that it might be optimal for the principal to introduce variability in the compensation schemes of risk-averse agents even if the output is not especially responsive to the action taken by a single agent.

Wage payment systems, Game theory, Incentives (Business)

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Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcomes in auctions with correlated types

Article Abstract:

The Bayesian equilibrium can produce the full extraction outcome when used as a mechanism for the full surplus extraction in auctions with correlated types. Moreover, the multiplicity problem of standard auction model can be addressed by the use of sequential mechanisms. The problem can also be addressed by using the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in predicting the outcome of the sequential mechanism.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Auctions, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments

Article Abstract:

The implementation of perfect Bayesian Equilibria in economic systems is discussed.

United States, Usage, Evaluation, Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis, Economic systems

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