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Information revelation and certification intermediaries

Article Abstract:

A model that describes the role of certification intermediaries in markets with asymmetric information is presented. The model centers on a limited set of factors to demonstrate in a particular manner how intermediaries may benefit from manipulating information. In dealing with these issues, information revelation must be considered as a strategic decision for these intermediaries. Further, the model demonstrates that an intermediary can gain from the manipulation of information in a proper way.

Author: Lizzeri, Alessandro
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1999
Information Systems & Theory, Management, Business intelligence, Competitive intelligence

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Informal learning: the new frontier of employee & organizational development

Article Abstract:

The Teaching Firm, a training program developed by the cooperative effort of private and public agencies in Connecticut, espouses informal learning as the venue for employee training and skills enhancement. The Teaching Firm research team believes that additional knowledge in basic subjects such as English, Math, History, Physics and the Social Sciences is important for more enhanced workplace productivity.

Author: Leslie, Bruce H., Aring, Monika Kosmahl, Brand, Betsy
Publisher: American Economic Development Council
Publication Name: Economic Development Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0742-3713
Year: 1998
Employee Training, Research, Social policy, Connecticut, Business and education, Industry and education

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Informal communication

Article Abstract:

A model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If the sender's honesty concerns are strong enough then the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium, and if they are not strong it creates an incentive for lying.

Author: Olszewski, Wojciech
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2004
Management-Communications, Organizational communication, Information accessibility

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Subjects list: Models, Information management
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