Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

Article Abstract:

The influence of market competition on firms' investment opportunities has been studied by modeling the inter-temporal cash flow trade-off the managers and owners have to deal with. General functional forms are used in examining investment and industry interaction rather than linear functions for demand and cost. Firms are assumed to operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and have mutually exclusive choices of investing in short- or long-term projects. Results indicate owners anticipate market rivalry and pay their managers with short- and long-term compensation even in the absence of owner-manager conflicts.

Management Compensation NEC, Evaluation, Compensation and benefits, Investments, Executives, Executive compensation, Conflict of interests (Agency), Monopolistic competition, Conflicts of interest

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Managerial style and the strategic choice of executive incentives

Article Abstract:

Corporate owners who do not exercise management control must consider the management styles and beliefs of their executives before creating a compensation package. A duopoly model with two stages, with owners choosing managerial incentives and managers setting output targets, suggests that when control and ownership are separated, compensation contracts must include specific goal provisions to prevent conflicts between the owner and managers.

Compensation management, Incentives (Business), Management games

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The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly

Article Abstract:

The usage of managerial contracts by non-profit organizations for better performance in mixed duopoly scenarios is examined.

United States, Management dynamics, SOCIAL SERVICES, Social Assistance, Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar Organizations, Nonprofit Institutions, Social Services & Nonprofit Institutns, Management, Economic aspects, Nonprofit organizations, Company business management, Duopolies, Management contracts

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