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Joint bidding in federal OCS auctions

Article Abstract:

The practice of joint bidding in auctions of leases on federal property was studied. Joint bidding occurs when at least two companies submit one bid on a lease. The study focused on land off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas in auctions occurring between 1954 and 1979. The results revealed that large firms bid jointly with fringe firms almost 50% of the time during the 1970s. Fringe firms usually bid jointly with large firms because of the capital constraints involved in fringe firms' joint ventures.

Author: Hendricks, Kenneth, Porter, Robert H.
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1992
Joint ventures, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Auctions

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Optimal selling strategies for oil and gas leases with an informed buyer

Article Abstract:

A government can acquire all rents for oil an gas exploration with a first-price, sealed bid auction, provided that the neighbor firm is excluded from the process. The royalty rate and reserve price should be set to zero, and the neighbor firm should be given an incentive to reveal information, so efficient drilling rule is used by the firm with the winning bid. Some of the rents should be shared if the neighbor firm cannot be excluded from the bidding process.

Author: Hendricks, Kenneth, Porter, Robert H., Tan, Guofo
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1993
Marketing, Oil and gas leases

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The timing and incidence of exploratory drilling on offshore wildcat tracts

Article Abstract:

Learning and strategic delay conditions are defined for exploratory drilling based on federal offshore tract sales between 1954 and 1990. Firms under such conditions generate information externalities due to minimal and uncertain information regarding the tracts. Thus, firms have an incentive to delay drilling decision and a noncooperative Nash equilibrium is developed for drilling programs.

Author: Hendricks, Kenneth, Porter, Robert H.
Publisher: American Economic Association
Publication Name: American Economic Review
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0002-8282
Year: 1996
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction, Crude petroleum and natural gas, Offshore Oil & Gas, Economics, Learning models (Stochastic processes), Natural gas exploration, Offshore oil fields, Information theory, Oil and gas exploration, Petroleum exploration, Oil well drilling, Submarine, Offshore oil well drilling, Stochastic models, Information theory in economics

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Subjects list: Research, Economic aspects
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