STRATEGIC CERTIFICATION AND PROVISION OF QUALITY

Article Abstract:

We study the effect of the presence of a certification intermediary in an environment where information asymmetries are particularly severe. The intermediary improves the information that buyers have about quality. This in turn increases the incentives that the seller has to provide high-quality goods. Efficiency is increased by the presence of the intermediary, but quality is underprovided in equilibrium relative to full information. The intermediary can implement the optimal policy in many ways. The amount of information revealed ranges from full disclosure to partial, noisy disclosure.

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FURTHER RESULTS ON BAYESIAN METHOD OF MOMENTS ANALYSIS OF THE MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL

Article Abstract:

In this article we extend previous BMOM results by showing how information about a variance parameter and its relation to regression coefficients produces a rich class of postdate densities for regression parameters. Prediction and model selection techniques are also described. We also discuss the well-documented link between cross-entropy and the average log odds and then use this criterion in an experiment to compare results obtained from BMOM and Bayes approaches using data generated from known models.

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• Abstracts: MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY PROVISION OF ADDICTIVE GOODS. A PARTIAL REHABILITATION OF HOTELLING'S MC-PRICING THEOREM

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