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Oligopoly with asymmetric information: differentiation in credit markets

Article Abstract:

Credit applicants tend to undergo less intensive screen tests under a capital market exhibiting more differentiation as shown by an analysis using an oligopoly model with asymmetric information. Such may be explained by the fact that banking institutions are likely to issue less comprehensive tests to credit applicants since the competition for profitable customers is less pronounced. These results imply that customer welfare is indirectly proportional to market competition.

Author: Villas-Boas, J. Miguel, Schmidt-Mohr, Udo
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1999
Research, Models, Information theory, Credit market, Credit markets, Oligopolies, Information theory in economics

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Welfare effects of changes in environmental quality under individual uncertainty about use

Article Abstract:

State-preference model was employed to assess whether a passive user or a user of environmental resource is willing to preserve or maintain the viability of the non-market public goods or the resouce ground itself. The model allows the quantitative calculation of an individual option price, which is the prime measure of individual advantage for ex ante cost benefit studies. The effect on the value of the good as the changes in number of participation is noted.

Author: Cameron, Trudy Ann, Englin, Jeffrey
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1997
Administration of General Economic Programs, Economic Statistics & Research, Management Science, Operations research, Economic conditions, Welfare economics

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Toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to analyze steps for promoting a formal political economy of environmental economics. Economists' quasi-unanimous preference for complex incentive regulation was examined. The constitutional constraints of environmental policy instruments was then analyzed. Results indicated that sophisticated environmental policy depends on nonverifiable factors that cannot be based in the constitution and must be delegated to politicians.

Author: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Boyer, Marcel
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1999
Political aspects

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Subjects list: Analysis, Economics, Environmental economics
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