On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information

Article Abstract:

A symmetric weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE) was developed to show that firms can accommodate a collusion in certain phases of the equilibrium. This equilibrium Pareto-dominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, providing insights into the profitability of a WRPE. This characterization contradicts the proposition and conclusion reached by Chen (1995) who suggested that firms are not able to sustain a collusion in any stage of a WRPE.

Econometrics & Model Building, Economics, Econometrics, Price fixing, Information theory, Business models, Information theory in economics

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Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games

Article Abstract:

A theory to consider the problem of renegotiation in symmetric repeated games, taking bargaining power into account, is tested with a focus on perfect monitoring, but also with consideration of imperfect monitoring. The consistent bargaining equilibria of infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring are found to be strongly symmetric, with elementary solutions. Simple formulae are provided, and the linear Cournot supergame is solved.

Usage, Game theory

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Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information

Article Abstract:

A multilateral procedure for bargaining is examined where the parties know only about their shares. The proposal is known to everyone after the response stage and responders have positive beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. Multiple equilibria is developed by employing strategy profiles where a responder refuses any offer which reduces his or her share.

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