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Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies

Article Abstract:

Utility function and the amount of initial endowment have been found to cast a significant impact on the preferences of consumers acting under pure public good economies. Using qualitative and asymptotic data, it was found that consumers tend to prefer the Lindahl allocation over the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, provided that the highest initial endowment was met. However, in conditions wherein income is diverse and consumer preferences are relatively identical, the use of Lindahl equilibrium may not be appropriate.

Author: Shitovitz, Benyamin, Spiegel, Menahem
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
Models, Economic research, Consumer preferences

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Product differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly

Article Abstract:

The non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with homogeneous goods is not exclusively caused by the homogeneous goods assumption. To guarantee equilibrium existence, a higher level of product differentiation in asymmetric cases must be obtained. When an equilibrium exists in the Bertrand-Edgeworth game, such equilibrium is considered unique.

Author: Canoy, Marcel
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Economic aspects, Product differentiation

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Subjects list: Analysis, Economics, Equilibrium (Economics)
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