Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games

Article Abstract:

The roles of 'optimistic stable standards of behavior' (OSSB) in repeated extensive form games are examined. This extends the use of 'the theory of social situations' in game theory. Nondiscriminating OSSBs are characterized and conditions for the existence of unique nondiscriminating OSSBs are developed. Results show that nondiscriminating OSSBs choose Pareto optimal subgame perfect equilibrium in repeated games.

Game theory

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Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information

Article Abstract:

The effects of unmediated communication with regard to the implementation of strategic games are analyzed. It is shown that irrespective of the mediated and nonmediated communications used, players implement similar outcomes.

United States

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