Political constraints on executive compensation: evidence from the electric utility industry

Article Abstract:

The effect of political and regulatory limitations on the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) is studied. The model used data from 87 electric utilities in the US from 1978 to 1990. Results confirm the findings of the study conducted by Joskow, Rose and Shepard in 1993. It found out that the compensation received by CEOs are directly affected by the political and regulatory scenario in which the electric utilities operate.

Electric Utilities, Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Models, Compensation and benefits, Chief executive officers, Wages, Wages and salaries

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Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted on the market influence in the British electricity generation industry using oligopoly models and price-cost markups. Results showed that the prices charged by generators are higher than the marginal cost but are not as high as what oligopoly models predicted. Also, the prices generators charge are largely affected by regulatory control and financial contracts of the suppliers and the customers.

Electric Power Generating, Electric Power Generation, United Kingdom, Prices and rates, Duopolies

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Strategic bidding in a multiunit auction: an empirical analysis of bids to supply electricity in England and Wales

Article Abstract:

Comparison of bidding behavior among electric utilities in England and Wales to theoretical foundations of uniform-price multiunit procurement auctions showed that plants had the incentive to make strategic bid increases. This result follows from theoretical expectations where bidders with over one unit will make such increases, and higher bids will come from larger companies for similar power generation projects.

Economic aspects, Energy use, Contracts, England, Letting of contracts, Competitive bidding, Wales, Auctions

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