Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof

Article Abstract:

An extended model is developed to study the preference domain where voting by committees is strategy-proof. It is demonstrated that any choice of a voter is cross-shaped when voting by committees without a dummy voter is strategy-proof on some rich domain. The cross-shaped domain is the optimal point where voting by committees is strategy-proof save for extraordinary situations.

Voting, Voting research

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Notes, comments, and letters to the editor: a maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules

Article Abstract:

The insistence of strategy-proofness, symmetry and efficiency will dictate that the single-plateaued domain will be the maximal domain. Single-plateau indicates that preference points are set in a closed interval, and are based on strategy-proofness, or the theory that agents can never benefit from misrepresenting their preferences.

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Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good

Article Abstract:

The unique maximal domain is established as the convex preferences domain where one pure public good is provided.

Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Social aspects, Economic aspects, Public goods

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