Abstracts - faqs.org

Abstracts

Economics

Search abstracts:
Abstracts » Economics

Repeated implementation

Article Abstract:

The possibility of improving the implementation of social alternatives through repetition is investigated. It is assumed that patience enables the implementor to overcome the information extraction problem. Dominant strategy implementation then becomes limitless when the implementor is only interested in doing things right in the long run as compared to an agent who performs time discounting. The results are in stark contrast to the prevailing assumption that dominant strategy implementation in a one shot environment can only be applied to implement dictatorial choices.

Author: Kalai, Ehud, Ledyard, John O.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1998
Decision-making, Decision making, Resource allocation, Social choice

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs

Article Abstract:

An economic model where hierarchies of beliefs are essential is taken in consideration. Conditions were put up under which agents' optimal behavior would meet at the Nash equilibrium characterized by the previously unknown correct fundamentals. The conditions are: (1) contractor property on the best-response mappings and (2) mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs. Non-satisfaction of the first condition may give rise to an 'anything is possible' result. Non-satisfaction of the second condition may give rise to cyclical of actions for every sample path.

Author: Nyarko, Yaw
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
Stochastic processes, Equilibrium (Economics)

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Reputation versus social learning

Article Abstract:

The use of reputation in strategic interaction could cause sudden changes in the equilibrium play of a group engaged in a finitely repeated game is an old notion in game theory. However, this notion do not apply in social settings where the game is played sequentially by many groups. This is illustrated in a model of Bayesian recurring games wherein novel strategies from the rational learning literature are employed.

Author: Jackson, Matthew O., Kalai, Ehud
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1999
Prisoner's dilemma game, Social learning, Reputation (Law), Reputation

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Models, Econometrics, Game theory, Business models, Research, Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis
Similar abstracts:
  • Abstracts: Risk and volatility: econometric models and financial practice. Risk aversion and allocation to long-term bonds
  • Abstracts: Welfare implications of endogenous credit limits with bankruptcy. Dynamic trading policies with price impact
  • Abstracts: On the speed of convergence in endogenous growth models. The empirics of growth and convergence: a selective review
  • Abstracts: The institutions of governance. Norms and networks in economic and organizational performance. The new institutional economics
  • Abstracts: Recommendations from a practical science conference. The ecological consequences of subsidizing the energy sector in Russia
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.
Some parts © 2025 Advameg, Inc.