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Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

Article Abstract:

Self-fulfilling mechanisms have the capacity to deliver a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibrium. These incentive compatible mechanisms typify a category of communications equilibria wherein a similar public signal is received by all agents prior to formulating their choices. Allocations that were obtained through a self fulfilling mechanism in an exchange economy with differential information correspond to the allocations of the rational expectations equilibrium in a strategic market game.

Author: Minelli, Enrico, Forges, Francoise
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
Econometrics & Model Building, Analysis, Econometrics, Rational expectations (Economics), Business models

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On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation

Article Abstract:

The study characterizes equilibria of games with two properties, firstly the agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; and secondly they can only add to their initial amounts. This equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stakelberg outcomes.

Author: Romano, Richard, Yildirim, Huseyin
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2005

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Star-shapedness of Richter-Aumann integral on a measure space with atoms: Theory and economic applications

Article Abstract:

The study conducted provides sufficient conditions for the integral of a correspondence defined on a measure space with atoms to exhibit star-shaped values. The results of the study is used to analyze the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of agents with atoms and of a competitive equilibrium in economies with mixed markets.

Author: D'Agata, Antonio
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2005

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Subjects list: Models, Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics)
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