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Stable networks

Article Abstract:

Concepts of Jackson and Wolinsky have shown that it may be impossible to generally combine efficiency and stability if the allocation rule is made anonymous on all graphs. However, if only effective graphs is arrived at, then the regulation that the allocation rule be anonymous on all graphs is unessentially compelling. A mechanism design approach is more suitable and indicates that under almost all value functions, the nonempty set stable graphs will be a subset of the effective graphs under the allocation rule which is anonymous on the domain of strongly stable graphs.

Author: Dutta, Bhaskar, Mutuswami, Suresh
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1997
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Social networks, Social structure

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Ranking opportunity sets and arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results

Article Abstract:

Similarities exist between the problem of ranking opportunity sets and that of social choice theory which involves putting together individual choices to come up with a general social preference structure. Rankings for freedom of choice and utility associated with the social choice theory are aggregated into a general ranking of opportunity sets. Knowledge of this relationship can help researchers draw up rules for the ranking procedure.

Author: Dutta, Bhaskar, Sen, Arunava
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 1996
Research, Ranking and selection (Statistics)

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Strategy- proof social choice correspondences

Article Abstract:

A strategy-proof rules are constructed that chooses sets of alternatives, as a function of agent's preferences over sets. On the domain of individual preferences over sets, two restrictions are considered.

Author: Barbera, Salvador, Dutta, Bhaskar, Sen, Arunava
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Theory
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0022-0531
Year: 2001
United States, Welfare economics, Economic theory

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Subjects list: Analysis, Economics, Social choice
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