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Sustaining collusion when the choice of strategic variable is endogenous

Article Abstract:

The issue of preserving collusion in a differentiated duopoly when the prospective deviant and the punisher can both freely select the strategic variable that will generate for them the highest profits possible. The analysis demonstrates that the traditional modeling of the supergame in which companies for the duration choose between price and output as their single common variable ignores the possibility that an asymmetric equilibrium will emerge in the 'punishment' phase.

Author: Rothschild, R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1995
Analysis, Strategic planning (Business), Duopolies, Conspiracy

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On the limits to the growth of coalitions by means of transfers

Article Abstract:

Expectations influence the growth and stability of coalitions wherein agents are permitted to select between membership and free riding. Lack of commitment on group members results to an unstable coalition when agents behave tactically. Coalition collapse is more preferred than self-financed transfer by agents with tactical behavior. On the other hand, attainment of a stable coalition becomes highly possible when agents behave strategically.

Author: Rothschild, R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 1998
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Economic aspects, Coalition (Social sciences), Coalitions (Social sciences), Social groups

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On the use of a modified Shapley value to determine the optimal size of a cartel

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the development of a variation of the Shapley value to determine the effect which a new member's entry has on an existing coalition. The optimal size of a cartel is discussed.

Author: Rothschild, R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0167-2681
Year: 2001
Business Methods, Research, Joint ventures, Business enterprises, Business planning, Cartels

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