The credibility game: reputation and rational cooperation in a changing population

Article Abstract:

The function of societal cooperative reputations to the success of labor- managed firms (LMFs) was examined. This involved the utilization of two models of the credibility game for ruling out the multiplicity of inefficient equilibria incipient in explanations of voluntary cooperation. It was found that communities with credible multifaceted interactions capable of work with the production activities of the community allow LMFs to flourish.

Models, Associations, institutions, etc., Associations, Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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Religion, science, and rationality

Article Abstract:

Allegations regarding the absence of a relationship between religion and scientific, rational and modern ways of thinking are examined to determine their validity. Using data from a 1969 survey of American college professors, it can be seen that most of the respondents consider themselves religious and attend church regularly. Assumptions on the nonrationality of religion lack merit due to the absence of empirical evidence.

Surveys, Religion and science, Science teachers

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Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Article Abstract:

The relation between tax evasion and tax morals with relation to risk aversion behavior of consumers is presented.

United States, Consumer Behavior, Tax evasion, Consumer behaviour, Risk aversion

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