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The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme

Article Abstract:

The role of debt as a governance mechanism is examined by studying the relation between debt, value, and agency costs. By focusing on emerging market firms for which pyramid ownership structures create potentially extreme managerial agency costs, the traditional financial statement data and new data on global debt contracts are utilized to examine whether debt can lessen the effects of agency and information problems. The results show that the beneficial effects of debt is concentrated in firms that have either a relatively high percentage of assets in place or few growth opportunities.

Author: Harvey, Campbell R., Lins, Karl V., Roper, Andrew H.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2004
Debt financing (Corporations), Corporate debt

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Emerging equity market volatility

Article Abstract:

It is vital to understand volatility in developing capital markets for resolving the cost of capital, and for assessing direct investment and resource allocation judgments. In completely integrated markets, volatility is heavily affected by world forces. In divided capital markets, volatility is more inclined to be influenced by local forces. It was demonstrated that more open economies, in relation to world trade, have notably lesser volatilities. Capital market liberalizations markedly reduce volatility in developing markets.

Author: Bekaert, Geert, Harvey, Campbell R.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 1997
Administration of General Economic Programs, Economic Planning & Research, Usage, Economic research, Economic conditions, Capital market, Capital markets

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Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs

Article Abstract:

The impact of manager and shareholder control power on takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions in 1990s is examined.

Author: Moeller, Thomas
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: Journal of Financial Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0304-405X
Year: 2005
Economic aspects, Tender offers (Securities), Tender offers

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Subjects list: United States, Analysis, Corporate governance
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