Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: comment

Article Abstract:

Glenn Harrison, in a 1989 research paper, stated that economic researchers should ensure that subjects have enough incentives to overcome the decision and calculation costs inherent in research. Otherwise, the researchers could lose control of the subjects' actions. Harrison stated that, if the payoff function is flat, control can be lost. New data show that the flatness of the payoff function can affect behavior only if the subjects are aware of the flatness.

Research, Harrison, Glenn W.

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Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: reply

Article Abstract:

The occurrence of seemingly robust behavioral anomalies in the decisions made by research subjects in controlled environments has led to increased criticism of economic theory. Critics of the 1989 research on first-price auctions have not paid attention to the broader implications of the payoff-dominance critique. The critique can be applied to many different experimental designs.

Evaluation, Experimental design, Research design

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• Abstracts: Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: comment. Theory and misbehavior in first-price auctions: comment

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