Unanimity and exclusion as mechanisms to eliminate free riding in public goods: digrammatical illustrations

Article Abstract:

Two schemes for group decisions on public goods are considered in dealing with free-rider problems. These are Wicksell's principle requiring unanimity for any group decision where no individual can benefit from a public good unless the individual shares the costs and exclusion of noncontributors. Analysis show that while exclusion prevents free-riding, in reality the individual benefit pricing scheme which sets individual contributions by determining a participant's willingness and ability to pay is still open to easy-riding due to inequitable cost distribution of authorities.

Economic aspects, Tax benefit rule

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Regret, warm-glow and bounded rationality in experiments on binary public goods

Article Abstract:

Besides the standard Bayesian model, the Regret and Warm-glow models are examined in order to explain experimental data on binary public goods.

United States, Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis

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Statistical dynamics in a chaotic Cournot model with complementary goods

Article Abstract:

A study on chaotic economic dynamics model is presented and the use of its properties is analyzed.

Japan, Finance, Financial statistics

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