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Upgrades, tradeins, and buybacks

Article Abstract:

The pricing of the new generation of quality good relies significantly on what a monopolist knows about its past customers. The monopolist in an active secondhand market with anonymous customers may either produce or repurchase an old product once a new product is available. However, given a monopolist without secondhand market and with customers who can prove that they purchased the old good to qualify for a discount on the new one, marketing problems for the two second-period products uncouple. Thus, sales of the old good follow the standard Coasian dynamics.

Author: Fudenberg, Drew, Tirole, Jean
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1998
Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods, WHOLESALE TRADE--DURABLE GOODS, Durable Goods Wholesalers, Monopolies, Durable goods

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Network competition: II. Price competition

Article Abstract:

Price discrimination is shown to substantially affect the nature of competition in both the mature and entry stages of the interconnection between telephone services. This is due to the tendency of the price discrimination to effect a misallocation of resources on the demand side. High access charges was not shown to significantly raise profits or prices, especially since the model shows the equilibrium profits at a low level in discriminatory nonlinear tariffs than those in uniform nonlinear tariffs.

Author: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Tirole, Jean, Rey, Patrick
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1998
Wired Telecommunications Carriers, Telephone Communications, Telephone communications, exc. radio, Models, Economic aspects, Telephone services, Interconnection (Telecommunications), Access charges (Telephone), Telephone access charges

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Pricing regulation under bypass competition

Article Abstract:

Bypass competition profits customers at the expense of the taxpayer when transfers are permitted between the regulator and the network operator, thus providing an advantage on large consumers but harming small ones. Small users are charged at a marginal price above marginal cost, while medium/large users are served at a marginal price that is lesser than marginal cost.

Author: Jullien, Bruno, Rey, Patrick, Curien, Nicolas
Publisher: Rand, Journal of Economics
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Subject: Economics
ISSN: 0741-6261
Year: 1998
COMMUNICATION, Communications, Broadcasting and Telecommunications, Pricing Policy, Laws, regulations and rules, Telecommunications services industry, Telecommunications industry, Bypass carriers (Telecommunication), Bypass carriers (Telecommunications)

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Subjects list: Prices and rates, Pricing
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