(s, S) equilibria in stochastic games

Article Abstract:

A stochastic game model assuming the participation of two players could prove to have an equilibrium characterized by Markov perfection in two-sided rules under a situation where either player could make discrete or discontinuous changes in the factors impinging on outcomes. The model has three restrictions including that of fixed cost. The Markov-perfect equilibrium is derived from an analysis of the best response map which is monotonic in nature.

Models, Analysis, Stochastic processes

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Dynamic variational preferences

Article Abstract:

An axiom for dynamic variational preferences is tested for application in macro economics and finance management.

Financial Systems & Controls, Financial Management, Usage, Macroeconomics, Axioms, Dynamical systems

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Equilibria in large games with continuous procedures

Article Abstract:

The finds that equilibria are different in large games using boundedly rational procedures.

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