Trade with polluting nonrenewable resources

Article Abstract:

The implications of market power of either supply and demand on nonrenewable resource markets is presented. Using a noncompetitive scenario as a Stackelberg differential game led by a resource seller's cartel, it is determined that the sellers market power decreases the buyer's emission tax and makes it lower than the marginal current value of pollution damage. It is suggested that resource rent is one of the important factors in the qualitative determination of emission taxation on noncompetitive resource markets.

Economic aspects, Environmental aspects, Commerce, Renewable natural resources, Renewable resources

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Nonconvexities in optimal pollution accumulation

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted on optimal pollution accumulation or detrimental stock externalities. The assumptions that the level of damage is unbounded and that pollution decay increases monotonically with the level of pollution stock are found to be restrictive. A decay function which is concave with low stock levels and convex when pollution is higher was specified. Furthermore, the global optimal solution may be independent of the initial pollution level despite the existence of multiple steady states.

Analysis, Externalities (Economics), Control

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