Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies

Article Abstract:

A hierarchical model describing taxpayer compliance is presented. The model defines a tax policy selected by the government, which then passes the responsibility for tax collection to the IRS. It is shown that economic conditions are set such that income is explained by a fixed distribution, while the government nor the IRS have information on individual income differences. In addition, the IRS receives a government-proposed budget much lower than predicted calculations.

Taxpayer compliance

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Equal sacrifice and incentive compatible income taxation

Article Abstract:

Combination of equal sacrifice with incentives in a taxation system leads to some interesting calculations. A study of the concepts reveals that such systems do exist, and while not necessarily superior to the optimal income tax theory, would provide a useful direction for future study. Calculations of such a system are given, and the two systems are compared for their distinct advantages in the area of welfare reform.

Finance, taxation, & monetary policy, Analysis

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The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in Canada

Article Abstract:

Research is presented describing the study of tax reform legislation introduced in Canada during 1988 which altered personal income taxation levels.

Canada, Taxation

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