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On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist

Article Abstract:

An examination of taxation policy relating to nonrenewable resources monopolists revealed that when the state followed the incremental surplus subsidy scheme with an exit tax (ISSET), monopolists chose efficient paths of extraction. ISSET was a nonlinear rule which enabled the state to tax monopolists efficiently despite possessing little information about reserves or costs. Schemes such as the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) and the ISSET continued to function even if variables, such as the effort made to extract nonrenewable resources, were not observed by the state.

Author: Karp, Larry, Livernois, John
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1992
Evaluation, Protection and preservation, Nonrenewable natural resources, Nonrenewable resources

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How to tax a spatial monopolist

Article Abstract:

A model reflects the activity between a government that maximizes tax revenue and a spatial monopolist that maximizes profit. The model assumes the government utilizes a per-unit output tax and a transport tax, while the monopolist is able to strategically change its location and mode of transport. The model demonstrates that if the government is only allowed to use one tax instrument, it would use a per-unit output tax as this forces the monopolist to use inefficient strategic choices in order to avoid profit losses.

Author: Heywood, John S., Pal, Debashis
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1996
Public Finance Activities, Tax Management, Corporate Tax Administration, Models, Tax accounting, Corporate taxes, Tax administration

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Truth or consequences: enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting

Article Abstract:

An extension of the standard model of enforcement was formulated which takes into account self-reporting requirement and enforcement power. The model shows that higher compliance rates are attained with lower noncompliance fines. The model also reveals that an equal to zero noncompliance fine tends to lessen the cost of implementing a given level of aggregate pollution. Such findings opposes a traditional claim that higher fines result to higher compliance rates.

Author: Livernois, John, McKenna, C.J.
Publisher: Elsevier B.V.
Publication Name: The Journal of Public Economics
Subject: Government
ISSN: 0047-2727
Year: 1999
Environmental Management, Psychological aspects, Research, Analysis, Economic research, Fines (Penalties), Compliance, Compliance (Psychology)

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Subjects list: Taxation, Monopolies
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