Reward structures in public good experiments

Article Abstract:

Results from a laboratory experiment in voluntary contributions for a public good are compared using two reward structures with interior equilibria. The first reward structure induces a set of Nash equilibria that shares the same total donations, while the second induces a unique dominant-strategy equilibrium. Some subjects are still altruistic even if experimenters exert their best efforts to induce egoistic preferences.

Research, Altruism, Altruism (Human behavior)

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After you - endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games

Article Abstract:

A study examining the donors' contributions to a public good, when the true value of the good is unknown to them, is presented. The sequential moves and the two contribution orders arising are also studied. Although in an exogenous environment, gain from sequential moves is smaller, results indicate that, sequential moves are more beneficial to the involved parties, when these are imposed upon them.

Analysis, Sequential analysis

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Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty

Article Abstract:

A study examines the value of public goods when their distribution is high.

Capital funds & cash flow, Valuation

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