Assumptions, goals and dominant undertakings: the regulation of competition under Article 86 of the European Union

Article Abstract:

There are significant differences in the antitrust enforcement and competition policies of the United States and the European Union (EU), and dominant American businesses should not assume that compliance with one jurisdiction equals compliance with another. The civil law nations that make up much of the EU enforce competition laws in a less adversary, more investigatory manner than do US agencies. The Europeans are much more committed to regulation and to having regulated industries, so enforcers are more willing to consider long-term remedies.

Interpretation and construction, Comparative analysis, Unfair competition (Commerce), Unfair competition, Antitrust law (International law), European Community, Comparative law

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FCC jurisdiction over local telephone under the 1996 Act: fenced off?

Article Abstract:

Congress did not resolve pre-existent problems concerning jurisdictional authority in the Communications Act of 1934 when it enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 1996 Act was the subject of litigation soon after its enactment as the Act left intact the dual federal-state 1934 regulation scheme which has been the source of years of conflict. The goals of deregulation and creation of competition in local telephone service markets can be achieved if courts concentrate on the 1934 Act's section 2(b), absent congressional amendment.

Telecommunications services industry, Telecommunications industry, Deregulation

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Competition and foreclosure in the context of installed base and compatibility effects

Article Abstract:

Analysis of the standards and network effects that occur in technology industries when dominant firms have substantial installed bases suggests that competition can be affected by control of technology. The installed base can be a source of market power, particularly in industries where compatibility is important, and denying access to compatibility could significantly raise rivals' costs. The existence of a first network may foreclose market entry by additional networks, and market power could be extended to complementary goods.

Economic aspects, Standardization, Overhead costs, Compatible hardware, Compatibility (Computers)

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