Communication and cooperation among competitors: the case of the airline industry

Article Abstract:

The price signalling of the airline industry does not violate antitrust law. Prices are communicated by electronic networks, with advance notices given of changes in fares. Such an information network is unique to the industry and fosters competition in prices rather than price fixing. What is occurring is an environment of parallel pricing, in which airlines and travel agents sell tickets of other airlines.

Analysis, Economic aspects, Airlines, Price fixing

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The power-buyer defense in merger cases

Article Abstract:

The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines will require a more selective use of the strong buyer defense in an antitrust merger case. The strong buyer argument will now be only one market factor to consider of many. One issue with the argument is whether large buyers can avoid oligopoly prices. Another issue is whether small buyers exist in the market and if they would be hurt by the merger.

Cases, Horizontal integration

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