Reply to editor's note, symposium on the law of vertical restraints in franchise cases and summary adjudication

Article Abstract:

The author responds to an editor's note in a symposium issue of Antitrust Law Journal in which he contributed an article. The author indicates several points where he believes the editor's note includes misinterpretations of his article.

Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors, Antitrust Law, Vertical markets

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The Sherman Act's unintended bias against Lilliputians: small players' collective action as a counter to relational market power

Article Abstract:

The author discusses the Sherman Act's bias against professionals who practice individually or in small groups who must do business with buyers or sellers with market power, small business that confront powerful buyers or sellers, and independent contractors that sell services to powerful buyers and sellers.

Small business, Unfair competition (Commerce), Unfair competition

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Market definition in franchise antitrust claims: relational market power and the franchisor's conflict of interest

Article Abstract:

Approaches to franchise antitrust claims are discussed. The article gives an overview of law and policy considerations underlying franchise antitrust claims, describes the nature of relational market power that franchisors exercise over franchisees, examines market definitions as used by courts, and suggests a means of balancing the parties' interests.

Vertical integration

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