On price elasticities of international telecommunication demand

Article Abstract:

The link between prices and demand for international telecommunications services was studied by examining the price elasticity of telecommunications demand in Sweden and six of its major trading partners. A linear regression model analyzing telecommunications data from 1976 to 1990 incorporating variables such as deflated communications prices, deflated Swedish trade volume, industrial production index and production index of destination countries was developed. It was discovered that the price elasticity of telecommunications which went to five trading partners were greater than one or elastic. Price elasticity of the US, the sixth partner, was almost zero, indicating prices were inelastic.

Research, Supply and demand, Telecommunications, Telecommunication, Elasticity (Economics)

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From cost plus determinations to a network price cap

Article Abstract:

Interconnection pricing in the United Kingdom has undergone major developments since 1985. During the early period of transition, the structure of interconnection charges was simple and services are determined in an allocated cost basis. At the second stage of development, the Office of Telecommunications moved to liberalize unbundled services by implementing a standard pricing policy. Eventually, OFTEL adopted a more regulatory approach in determining interconnection charges through the introduction of network price cap. Under this system, carriers have limited incentives to reduce costs and are compelled to follow an equal mark up policy for services.

Regulation and Administration of Communications, Electric, Gas, and Other Utilities, Telecommunications Regulation, United Kingdom, Economic aspects, Telecommunications regulations, Interconnection (Telecommunications)

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The pricing of international telecommunications services by monopoly operators

Article Abstract:

A study on the pricing of international telecommunications services by monopoly operators in a double marginalization environment shows that accounting and settlement rates are higher in a non-cooperative than in a cooperative context. Common settlement rates only occur when the profits evaluated at an incoming cost-based settlement rate are equal while operators in collusion with regulators often require uniform settlement rates prior to negotiations.

Models, Prices and rates, Monopolistic competition

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