Light-handed regulation of access in Australia: negotiation with arbitration

Article Abstract:

The potential impact arising from a light-handed regulatory process that is based on negotiation in the Australian setting is examined. A formal model of the access procedures is proposed as a tool to investigate the light-handed regulatory process where the bargaining game is taken into account. The interaction between bargaining, integration and potential regulatory intervention is shown to result in various equilibrium outcomes.

Australia, Economic policy, Negotiation, Negotiations, Arbitration (Administrative law), Administrative arbitration

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Productivity growth and regulation in U.S. local telephony

Article Abstract:

A study was conducted to investigate the local telephony in the US. The objectives were to provide a detailed characterization of the technology over a certain period of time and to analyze the role of alternative forms of regulation in enhancing efficiency of the regulated firms. Results did not indicate differential levels of efficiency that arise from the increasing prevalence of alternative regulatory regimes.

Computer telephony, Industrial efficiency, Economic efficiency, Industrial productivity, Computer-Telephone integration

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