A non-weakly balanced game with non-empty bargaining set

Article Abstract:

An analysis of previous research involving balanced games is presented. Earlier research has concluded the determination of a non-empty bargaining set for each weakly balanced game. Several versions of such a bargaining set for cooperative games have evolved. A specific model defines an existence theorem for a bargaining set under assumptions of weak balancedness. It is shown that a balanced game which is not weakly balanced and possesses a loaded bargaining set is theoretically possible.

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Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus

Article Abstract:

Thorough understanding of game theory's cooperative solutions require knowing the solution's definition, axiomatic foundation and non-cooperative interpretation. An example of a solution concept in game theory is the nucleolus, which calls for welfare maximization of the worst-off coalitions. The nucleolus' non-cooperative aspects can be studied with the help of a consistency-based multilateral bargaining game that allows partial agreements and bilateral negotiations.

Cooperation (Economics), Cooperation

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Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints

Article Abstract:

Previous research has shown that security level penal codes in symmetric, capacity-constrained Bertrand supergames are the optimal penal codes for this broad class of games. However, a reexamination of the symmetry assumptions of such games reveals that this result only occurs when capacity constraints, marginal costs and firms' discount factors are not too dissimilar.

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