A stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information

Article Abstract:

The basic two-player game model of noncooperative sequential bargaining is extended to a k-player framework with a Markov nature. The model includes 'sets of subgame perfect and stationary subgame perfect payoffs' which are characterized by a proposal from a single agent at every period and 'unanimous agreement' thereafter. Using these properties, several issues are explored. These pertain to the uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibria, reasons for delayed agreements and the merit of proposals.

Markov processes

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem

Article Abstract:

A new condition for any n-player game to satisfy the perfect folk theorem in a finite horizon setting is introduced. The intuitive condition, otherwise known as the recursively distinct Nash payoffs, mandates that 'players' behavior be iteratively leveraged' near the close of the finitely-repeated game. A discussion of its proof, which also provides proof of a necessary condition for nonequivalent utilities, shows that games which meet the condition have distinct Nash payoffs.

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Renegotiation in finitely repeated games

Article Abstract:

An analysis of finitely repeated games is presented. The analysis focuses on the impact of player renegotiations on the development of perfect equilibrium conditions. Limiting properties of payoff sets in equilibria which exhibit immunity to renegotiation are considered. It is shown that either a singleton or a connected subset of Paretoefficient basis are conditioned by the limit of payoff sets.

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