Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

Article Abstract:

Repeated games were analyzed in terms of the effects of communication timing on the ability of players to support efficient results. Inefficient outcomes are prevented whenever players delay the revelation of their observations. By delaying the communication of observations, players are able to cut the cost of deterring deviations. Difficulty in implementing sanctions was also established due mainly to constraints associated with revelation of observations.

Econometrics & Model Building, Econometrics, Communication, Communications, Business models

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Multistage situations

Article Abstract:

Social environments within the framework of 'multistage situations' are analyzed through the solution concept of a conservative stable standard of behavior. Multistage situations are environments wherein a defined set of paths are unsatisfied. An equivalence theorem between subgame perfection and the largest conservative stable standard of behavior for multistage games is also presented.

Multiple criteria decision making

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