Essential equilibria of n-person noncooperative games

Article Abstract:

The essential equilibria of n-person noncooperative games were examined via a topological structure on the space of games and on the space of solutions. This topological structure was provided by fixing a finite game form and parametrizing games by payoffs. The results suggested that most of the games in the Baire Category sense are essential or weakly essential for three models: games parametrized by payoffs and feasible strategy correspondences, games parametrized by payoffs and strategy spaces and games parametrized by payoffs alone.

Models, Equilibrium (Economics), Games of strategy (Mathematics)

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An ordinal selection of stable sets in the sense of Hillas

Article Abstract:

A definition of stable sets set out by Hillas is explored in detail in the context of noncooperative games. The stability of such sets is examined.

Research, Game theory, Set theory

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