Existence and upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium distributions of anonymous games with discontinuous payoffs

Article Abstract:

The existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria remains one of the reasons for studying large games with a continuum of players. The Nash equilibrium distributions and the closed graph property of the equilibrium distribution correspondence are also proven to exist based on the supremum norm topology on the space of payoff functions and a tightness assumption on the game. These anonymous games have compact metric action spaces and payoff functions that are upper semicontinuous although not necessarily lower continuous.

---

Existence of equilibrium in abstract economies with discontinuous payoffs and non-compact choice spaces

Article Abstract:

The presence of social equilibrium in abstract economies characterized by discrete payoffs, non-compact choice spaces and an infinite number of agents is analyzed. The analysis results indicate the existence of a competitive equilibrium that do not require several of the constraints imposed on the marginal rate of technical alternation on consumption or production sets. The restrictions pertain to the qualities of interiority, compactness and continuity.

---

Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the problem involving designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods market conditions. The analysis assumes that initial endowments remain as private information, public endowments are consumed but not destroyed and agents do not need to reveal their true endowments. It is shown that such a model illustrates properties which serve as the basis for the Lindahl correspondence.

Public goods, Welfare economics

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. An extension of the KKMS Theorem
• Abstracts: The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame. Computability and randomness of Nash equilibrium in infinite games
• Abstracts: The maximum and minimum of primary forecasts. The uses and abuses of 'consensus' forecasts

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.