Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the licensing application to cost reducing innovation is presented. The analysis focuses on such innovation in an oligopolistic market setting. Implications of three individual licensing methods are conditioned by innovation magnitude, number offirms and demand price elasticity. Results show that auctioning licenses exhibit optimal results while royalty licensing does not generate superior conditions.

Licensing agreements, Technological innovations

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A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies

Article Abstract:

The division, for instance, of two goods among three agents presents conflicts in shifting from convex to non-convex economies. The authors assume no-domination rather than no-envy. Incompatibility with Pareto efficiency is demonstrated.

Belgium, Methods, Efficient market theory, Pareto, Vilfredo

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Acceptable and Walrasion allocations

Article Abstract:

Factors affecting the contributions made by individuals to a given economy are examined in detail.

Walrasian model

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