Repeated games with differential time preferences

Article Abstract:

Strategic games require patient agents who are willing to play with identical time preferences. Each player agrees to play a set of feasible pay-offs of the repeated game that coincides with the stage-game. Patience is necessary to sustain all feasible and individually rational payoffs. Pay-offs offer mutual benefit to players using currently imposed time preference. The convex-hull of the underlying stage-game pay-offs will be smaller than the set of feasible repeated pay-offs.

Mathematics, Econometrics & Model Building, Econometrics, Game theory, Combinatorial optimization, Business models, Games of strategy (Mathematics)

---

The "Devil's Horns" problem of inverting confluent characteristic functions

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the problems arising from the invertion of confluent characteristic functions reveals that distortions arising are both analytical and numerical. The study also points out that joint degeneracy within a function may be expressed as bivariate and multivariate cases. The graph of these inconsistencies take the form of two sharp spikes otherwise known as 'devil's horns.'

Statistics, Models, Statistics (Data), Statistics (Mathematics), Equations, Equations (Mathematics), Mathematical statistics, Dynamic allocation, Dynamic memory allocation

---

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Continuous representability of homothetic preferences by means of homogeneous utility functions. Non-time additive utility optimization-the case of certainty
• Abstracts: A fractal forecasting model for financial time series. The importance of interest rates for forecasting the exchange rate
• Abstracts: Relative utilitarianism. Inference-without-smoothing in the presence of nonparametric autocorrelation
• Abstracts: Implementation with coalition formation: a complete characterization. An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Abstracts: Conditioning and aggregation of preferences. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Common Priors: a reply to Gul

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.