The Nash solutino and the utility of bargaining: a corrigendum

Article Abstract:

Alvin E. Roth's paper "The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining" which appeared in the 1978 issue of 'Econometrica' contained an error in theorem 4. This error was not corrected by the subsequent erratum. Thus, the presentation of a counterexample clearly showed the Nash solution violated one of the conditions imposed on the preference relation over positions of bargaining if there are more than two players. The counterexample contradicts the claim in theorem 4 because the utility function theta that was defined in that theorem did not satisfy condition (4) if n > 2.

Economic aspects, Criticism and interpretation, Negotiation, Negotiations, Roth, Alvin E.

---

Randomization as an instrumental variable

Article Abstract:

Randomized social experiments are evaluated as an instrumental variable using conventional econometric models. The models are applied to the randomization of admission into a program among eligible persons who would typically be admitted into a program and the randomization of eligibility for the program. The first type of randomization is widely used in applied work. Results indicate that conventional structural parameters are not generally identified by the two kinds of randomization widely used in conducting social experiments.

Research, Models, Testing, Tests, Probabilities, Probability theory, Random variables

---

Similar abstracts:

• Abstracts: Branch banking and the geography of bank pricing. Okun's coefficient: a comment. The direct costs of financial repression: evidence from India
• Abstracts: Implementation in generalized matching problems. Corrigendum. A model of random matching

This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.