Two characterizations of bargaining sets

Article Abstract:

A bargaining set is a solution concept encompassing the heart of a game. This game-theoretic concept is developed in the context of a social system. Using the atomless exchange economy as a model, two definitions of the core, which provide the same core but different bargaining sets, are explained. The difference between the characterizations revolves around the relationship of the bargaining set to the Walrasian equilibrium concept. The degree of equivalence of the two concepts is discussed.

Economic aspects, Negotiation, Negotiations, Walrasian model

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The core and the hedonic core: equivalence and comparative statics

Article Abstract:

Hedonic core payoffs can be interpreted as a competitive price function, an anonymous wage function in coalition production economies and an anonymous system of admissions prices in club economies. This allows the approximation theorem to be interpreted as a core convergence theorem. Two examples of how the hedonic price function can be interpreted as wages in a coalition production model and as admissions prices in club economies are presented.

Competition (Economics)

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