Virtual Bayesian implementation

Article Abstract:

An analysis of social choice functions approximated by equilibrium outcomes reveals that virtual Bayesian implementation necessitates incentive compatibility. The study also reveals that incentive compatibility is also sufficient for Bayesian incentive consistency and an example shows iteratively undominated strategies where Bayesian implementable social choice functions that are not implementable.

Analysis, Bayesian statistical decision theory, Bayesian analysis, Statistics, Statistics (Data), Social choice

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Reputation and experimentation in repeated games with two long-run players

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the effects of reputation in the decision making process of two long-run players involved in a repeated game reveals that patience with regards the overall strategy that one or both players is directly related to the equilibrium payoff. Commitment to a particular strategy results in a greater degree of attaining an average equilibrium payoff similar to the Stackelberg payoff.

Econometrics & Model Building, Methods, Decision-making, Decision making, Econometrics, Business models, Statistical decision, Statistical decision theory, Management games

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