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A post-apartheid constitution for South Africa: lessons from public choice

Article Abstract:

Constitutional economic theory, applied to study constitutional change in South Africa, suggests that a self-reinforcing constitution for South Africa should ensure decentralization of political authority and freedom of contract and private property rights. The pattern of constitutional debate must be redesigned into a voluntary association of autonomous groups, waiting to establish a cooperative society by selecting a range of likely constitutional alignments. The existing constitutional mechanism will not generate an efficient constitution, if this is not done.

Author: Lowenberg, Anton D.
Publisher: Cato Institute
Publication Name: The Cato Journal
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0273-3072
Year: 1992
South Africa, Study and teaching, Constitutional law, Constitutions

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Trade barriers in the theory of instrument choice

Article Abstract:

A formal model was developed on the theories of Robert Hahn on the influence of economic or cost restrictions on policy options to study this influence on domestic policy options of limiting the freedom of national governments to preserve trade barrier. National and regional governments will discover that, without the freedom to shut their borders to goods, services, capital and people, it is costlier, and virtually impossible, to use domestic policy instruments such as spending, taxes and regulations for redistribution.

Author: Migue, Jean-Luc
Publisher: Cato Institute
Publication Name: The Cato Journal
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0273-3072
Year: 1992
Analysis, Influence, Nontariff trade barriers, Cost control, Domestic policy

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Federalism and individual sovereignty: comment on Buchanan

Article Abstract:

James M. Buchanan's 'Federalism and Individual Sovereignty' concisely restates the Tiebout tradition of federalist analysis. Federalist structures minimize political coercion in society and consequently promote human freedom. Buchanan's belief that 'community bonding' is an active social value that can preferentially thrive within a federal system was supported by using Canada's experience of shifting transfer activities from local communities to the central government.

Author: Migue, Jean-Luc
Publisher: Cato Institute
Publication Name: The Cato Journal
Subject: Political science
ISSN: 0273-3072
Year: 1995
Research, Federalism, Sovereignty

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Subjects list: Models, Economics
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