The primacy of cooperation, rational bargaining, and an economic theory of part of the common law

Article Abstract:

Jules L. Coleman's 'Risks and Wrongs' raises questions related to the primacy of cooperation over competition, his account of rational bargaining theory as applied to contract law and the application of economic theory to contracts and torts. The role of rationality in choosing between competition and cooperation needs further explanation. Coleman's use of rational bargaining theory is sound, but the relevance of his notion of 'division rationality' to contracts is questionable. In addition, Coleman does not give adequate reason for separating contract and tort law into economic and noneconomic realms.

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On the domain of market rhetoric

Article Abstract:

Jules L. Coleman's attitude in 'Risks and Wrongs' toward the market rhetoric of commodification is ambivalent. He rejects the market paradigm as fundamental, but uses pragmatic methods to establish its appropriateness for the subdomain of contracts. In the theory of torts, Coleman's treatment of corrective justice as a default option also reflects a pragmatic attitude. However, his economic view of compensation conflicts with corrective justice, especially in denying compensation for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering.

Economic aspects, Torts

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The relation between competition and cooperation

Article Abstract:

Jules L. Coleman in 'Risks and Wrongs' argues for a version of rational choice contractarianism in which cooperation is prior to competition. He claims that this priority is analytical, causal and research-strategic. However, a better approach would be to regard cooperation and competition as unrelated, with no priority given to either form of interaction within rational choice theory. Rational choice is prior, whether it takes a competitive or cooperative form.

Competition (Economics)

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