Voluntary disclosures when seller's level of information is unknown

Article Abstract:

Experimental markets were used to test a disclosure model based on models created by R. Dye (1985) and W. Jung and Y. Kwon (1988). The previous research illustrated that senders of information withhold private information when the receivers of information are ignorant about whether the transmitters of information have private information. Research entailed conducting 24 multi-period laboratory markets, each characterized by a monopolist seller marketing an asset with a liquidating dividend known by the seller. Research results indicate that the voluntary disclosure of information increases when it is probable that the seller does not have private information.

Author: King, Ronald R., Wallin, David E.
Financial disclosure, Dye, R., Kwon, Y., Jung, W.

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Experimental tests of disclosure with an opponent

Article Abstract:

Experiments patterned after A. Wagenhofer's work on voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent were conducted in 32 markets. Wagenhofer's disclosure model predicted that multiple disclosure equilibria existed in cases where managers balance the effects of disclosures on capital market investors and opponents. Results show that the partial-disclosure equilibrium gained more support than the full-disclosure equilibrium. Markets with frequent interactions between disclosers and information receivers were found to have lower levels of disclosure.

Author: King, Ronald R., Wallin, David E.
Testing, Economic research, Disclosure statements (Accounting)

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An experimental investigation of multi-defendant bargaining in 'joint and several' and proportionate liability regimes

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the effects of liability procedures on the frequency and amount of settlements in legal suits involving a plaintiff and two defendants reveals that the frequency of settlement is lowest for regimes with joint and several allocation rules. The study offers a standard for assessing relative fault, relative wealth and legal costs with reference to their effects on settlement offers and acceptances.

Author: King, Ronald R., Ingberman, Daniel E., Dupoch, Nicholas
Economics, Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities, Accounting Methods NEC, Compromise and settlement, Settlements (Law), Plea bargaining, Equity (Law)

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Subjects list: Research, Accounting, Analysis
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