I'm not a high-quality firm-but I play one on TV
A study was conducted to evaluate the role of noise in a multidimensional signalling game. The study considers a monopolist who markets his products by signaling its quality to customers using selected price and advertising techniques. Results show that noisy advertising channels do not generate a separating equilibrium where the monopolist can apply simultaneous signalling. Low-quality firms thus have a chance to imitate high-quality firms's strategy.
Publication Name: RAND Journal of Economics
Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers
The purpose of directions on game-playing conduct is vital and informative. The results of the effect of experimental monitor cheap talk on ultimatum game offers are presented.
Publication Name: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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