Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator
Article Abstract:
A developed model of environmental regulation indicates that the stringency of the emission standard of a firm is dictated by cooperative bargaining between the firm and a regulator. Bargaining can be socially productive since it results in the first-best outcome which is never an equilibrium of the non-cooperative, Stackelberg game. Regulators do not look at the social cost function as the objective function if regulations are bargaining-dependent. There is lower social costs when a regulator is more concerned with damages and enforcement costs than to the firm's compliance costs.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 1996
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Instrument choice when regulators and firms bargain
Article Abstract:
Tax-based policy and standard-based policy can be used as instruments of firms in cooperative bargaining over a restrictive regulation. Threat points as well as assymmetries between the tax-based and standard-based policies are expected to increase if a firm adopts multiple technologies. Nevertheless, asymmetries in the outcomes of taxes and standards would keep on existing because the technologies adopted by the firms are not social-cost-minimizing.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 1998
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution
Article Abstract:
A study on the desirability of self-report in compliance of environmental legislation is explored using a principal-agent framework. The model compares firms that have and do not have self-report. Results indicate that self-report firms must be audited more oftenthan firms not required to self-report. Self-reporting may not necessarily reduce sanctions. The desirability of self-reporting depends on several variables.
Publication Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Subject: Environmental services industry
ISSN: 0095-0696
Year: 1993
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
- Abstracts: Taxing variable cost: environmental regulation as industrial policy. Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically
- Abstracts: Learning and stock effects in environmental regulation: the case of greenhouse gas emissions. Energy and depletable resources: economics and policy, 1973-1998
- Abstracts: Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec
- Abstracts: Environmental auditing in management systems and public policy. Managerial incentives and environmental compliance