Impure public goods and transfers in a three-agent model

Article Abstract:

Provision for impure public goods is examined in the context of non-cooperative private funding. If private spending on a public good is an imperfect substitute among contributing agents, such a good is impure. Bergstrom and Varian's (1985) neutrality result will not apply in such a case because transfers will affect the agents' utility and the equilibrium level of provision. Further analysis suggests that the giver's utility will rise and that of the receiver will fall with the reaction of an agent outside the transfer process. The results are applied in the case of national defense.

Externalities (Economics), Public goods, Transfer payments

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International public goods and contribution productivity differentials

Article Abstract:

An economic model is used to evaluate the economic effect of an institutional reform which can alter the cost of giving the public benefits. The model illustrates that a decline in output or an increase in the cost of giving a public benefit may raise the national welfare of its own nation though leaving the rest of the world unharmed. It is shown that a country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare.

Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs), Income Security, Domestic economic assistance, Welfare, Public assistance, Production (Economics), Input-output analysis

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Wealth taxation and economic growth

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the use of an endogenous growth model to determine the influence of the taxation of wealth on economic growth. The taxation of bequests, consumption and wage income is discussed.

Personal Taxes, Taxation, Economic development, Wealth, Gift tax, Tax and expenditure limitations

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