Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets

Article Abstract:

The health insurance market can be efficiently regulated either through a franchise given to the private sector to cater to a particular sector of the population or cross-subsidization of insurance policies. The cross-subsidization, however, needs to be made within the state sector because if it is done within the private sector the problem of adverse selection crops up. This problem refers to the gap between consumer knowledge about their ailments and information tracked by health insurance firms.

Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors, Insurance Regulation, Insurance industry, Insurance law

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The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market

Article Abstract:

Research is presented concerning the influence which piecemeal regulation has on the lowering of standards of the healthcare provided by healthcare maintenance organizations. The setting of healthcare standards is discussed.

Administration of Public Health Programs, Health Care Services, Standards, Medical care, Health planning

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A comment on Neudeck and Podczek's "adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets."

Article Abstract:

A personal view on the minimum standards imposed on the health insurance market is offered. Additional information on standards for insurers offering a single-option and multiple-option health plans is included.

United States, Marketing

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