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Effects of tort liability and insurance on heavy drinking and drinking and driving

Article Abstract:

Study of self-reported surveys on drinking and driving reveal that insurance liability schemes and criminal liability can have an effect on binge drinking behavior but once individuals engage in such behavior enhanced penalties or liability have little effect. Liability systems such as no-fault can have the effect of increasing traffic accidents and fatalities. Increasing liability costs and regulations can reduce drinking and driving behavior. The study reveals that once binge drinking has begun, insurance laws and criminal sanctions have little deterrent effect.

Author: Sloan, Frank A., Reilly, Bridget A., Schenzler, Christoph
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 1995
Drunk driving, Driving while intoxicated, Drinking and traffic accidents, Liability for traffic accidents

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Rates of time preference and consumer valuations of automobile safety and fuel efficiency

Article Abstract:

Empirical analysis of the trade-offs of costs and safety and fuel efficiency that consumers consider in automotive purchase and use decisions reveals that neither market failure or perfect efficiency is demonstrated by consumer responses. The model used incorporates the values consumers place on their lives as well as the discounting of the values of safety and fuel economy over time. The study does indicate that existing regulations should be taken into consideration when assessing the potential behavior-modifying impact of additional regulations.

Author: Viscusi, W. Kip, Dreyfus, Mark E.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 1995
Safety and security measures, Laws, regulations and rules, Automobiles, Safety regulations, Traffic safety

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The incentive effects of no-fault automobile insurance

Article Abstract:

The question of whether no fault automoblie insurance systems remove the tort law's incentive for safe driving is examined by empirical analysis. Fatal accident rates tend to be higher in no-fault jurisdictions. It is concluded that no-fault systems do remove some of the incentives for safe driving.

Author: Cummins, J. David, Phillips, Richard D., Weiss, Mary A.
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication Name: Journal of Law and Economics
Subject: Law
ISSN: 0022-2186
Year: 2001
No-fault automobile insurance, No fault automobile insurance, Incentive (Psychology)

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Subjects list: United States, Analysis, Economic aspects, Influence, Traffic accidents
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