Adaptive dynamics in coordination games

Article Abstract:

A model describing the process by which players learn to play repeated coordination games was developed to understand the adaptive dynamics of agents' choice of strategy in coordination games. The results showed that the dispersion of agents' beliefs interacts with the learning process to allow variation in strategy choices and the patterns of discrimination among equilibria in response to changes in the rules for payoffs and the size of interacting groups.

Equilibrium (Economics)

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p-Dominance and belief potential

Article Abstract:

The concept of belief potential of an information system and the concept of p-dominance of Nash-equilibria were introduced to explain game theory studies in which a unique equilibrium is chosen under conditions of higher order uncertainty. It was shown that a Nash-equilibrium is uniquely chosen whenever its p-dominance falls below the belief potential. This principle applies to many-action games as well as to games with no dominant strategies.

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